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PRACTICE AND PLEADINGS
I. LONG ARM STATUTE
Several court opinions of 1981 served to clarify the nature and extent of
contacts required under the District of Columbia Long Arm Statute. The
statute, found at section 13-423 of the D.C. Code, provides a number of
grounds on which in personam jurisdiction may be based.' It is a codifica-
tion of the "minimum contacts" doctrine first enunciated in International
Shoe Co. v. Washington.2
In Steinberg v. Interpol,3 the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit examined section 13-423(a)(4). This subsection
grants jurisdiction for causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia
through actions outside the jurisdiction. In Steinberg, plaintiff brought a
defamation action against defendant Interpol. The suit was based on In-
terpol's distribution of a document in the United States and other coun-
tries listing plaintiff as a wanted international criminal. Except for this act,
Interpol's contacts with the United States were few. It disseminated infor-
mation here and maintained close contact with the Department of Justice,
but kept no offices within the United States. Its interaction with this coun-
try was limited to the exchange of information with the United States Na-
tional Central Bureau (USNCB). The trial court found these contacts
1. D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423 (1981) provides:
(a) A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person,
who acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person's-
(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission
outside the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in
any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods
used or consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia ....
2. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In International Shoe the Supreme Court replaced the previous
jurisdictional fictions of "presence," "consent" and "doing business," with "minimum con-
tacts." Under the minimum contacts test, jurisdiction will be exercised if defendant's con-
tacts with the forum state make it fair and just to subject it to defend a suit there. See World-
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court of Ca-
lif., 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S.
186 (1977); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). For background on
the jurisdictional concepts preceeding International Shoe, see 2 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, & J.
WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 4.25[21 (2d ed. 1981).
3. 672 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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insufficient to fulfill the requirements of section 13-423(a)(4), and dis-
missed for lack of jurisdiction.
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed. At the outset, it noted that the jurisdictional question was not
whether the plaintiff should sue in another forum but whether the plaintiff
was entitled to any forum. Framing the issue in terms of whether Interpol
should be held answerable at all within the United States, the court turned
to an examination of Interpol's contacts. It found the communications with
USNCB sufficient, standing alone, to justify jurisdiction.
In Mouzavires v. Baxter,4 defendant's contacts were even fewer than in
Steinberg. Plaintiff, a local law firm, had been engaged by defendant, a
Florida law firm, to assist the defendant in a lawsuit. Plaintiffs contacts
with the forum consisted of its preliminary telephone call to defendant and
the execution of a subsequent retainer agreement by mail. Later, a dispute
arose between the parties as to compensation and the plaintiff sued in the
Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Jurisdiction was based on the
"transacting any business" provision of section 13-423(a)(1). In reversing
the lower court's quashing of service, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals stated that the language of subsection (a)(1) granted an expansive
basis for jurisdiction. The relevant consideration, the court said, was
whether the defendant engaged in any contractual activities which have a
consequence in the District. If there were a sufficient connection between
the defendant and the District to require the defendant to appear, the re-
quirements of subsection (a)(1) would be met and in personam jurisdiction
would be found.
The Steinberg and Mouzavires decisions change the District of Colum-
bia's concept of long-arm jurisdiction. The resulting view differs signifi-
cantly from International Shoe and subsequent cases. In some respects, the
District's approach is more constrained than the International Shoe doc-
trine. Section 13-423(b) requires the claim to be related to the activities on
which jurisdiction is based. In contrast, International Shoe holds only that
the jurisdiction must not violate the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment;5 "relationship" is not necessarily a prerequisite to meeting the
due process test.6 Since the District statute requires relationship while the
common law does not, the District concept is in this respect more strict.
4. 434 A.2d 988 (D.C. 1981).
5. 326 U.S. 310 (1945) (state laws regarding personal jurisdiction are constrained by
the due process clause). See also Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (all bases of jurisdic-
tion must conform with the due process clause).
6. In International Shoe, the court recognized that "there have been instances in which
the continuous operations within a state were. . . of such a nature as to justify suit against it
[Vol. 31:841
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In other respects, the District approach to long-arm jurisdiction exceeds
the limits set by the International Shoe doctrine. In Hanson v. Denckla,7
the Supreme Court reiterated that only the defendant's activities may be
examined when considering the minimum contacts question. The test is
whether the defendant's actions in view of "fair play and substantial jus-
tice" render it acceptable to require the defendant to appear. 8 Steinberg,
however, approached the question differently. It termed the issue as
whether the plaintiff should have a forum at all in the United States. It
considered the fairness and convenience to the plaintiff rather than to the
defendant. As such, the focus of the court's inquiry in Steinberg was
misplaced.
Nevertheless, the court probably reached the correct result for long-arm
jurisdiction could have been found based solely on an examination of In-
terpol's activities within the United States. Interpol derived substantial
benefit from the information exchanged with USNCB. Thus, under Inter-
national Shoe and its progeny, there was enough contact to find jurisdic-
tion. By focusing, however, on the convenience of the plaintiff the court
confused the approach mandated by International Shoe.
Similarly, in Mouzavires, the court examined the activities of both the
defendant and the plaintiff. The court's justification for this approach was
the previous agency relationship between the parties. The plaintiffs ac-
tions as agent, it argued, were attributable to the defendant. Nevertheless,
this was a needless expansion of the International Shoe approach. Jurisdic-
tion could have been found on defendant's actions alone. For example,
telephone calls and correspondence have been the basis of long-arm juris-
diction.9 Mouzavires went further, however, and established the principle
that, when a former agent sues a nonresident principal, the activities of the
agent may grant jurisdiction over the nonresident principal. This caveat
undermines the Hanson approach of ignoring unilateral acts of the
plaintiff.' 0
on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities." 326 U.S. at
318 (citations omitted).
7. 357 U.S. at 253.
8. International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316.
9. See Mouzavires, 434 A.2d at 995, citing Morton v. Environmental Land Systems,
Ltd., 55 I11. App. 3d 369, 370 N.E.2d 1106 (1977); Cook Assoc. Inc. v. Colonial Broach &
Mach. Co., 14 IUl. App. 3d 965, 304 N.E.2d 27 (1973); G & W Body Works, Inc. v. Estate of
Eschberger, 557 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977); Cohn-Daniel Corp. v. Corporacion De
La Fonda, Inc., 514 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
10. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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II. LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS
In Dupree v. Jefferson, " the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit for the first time addressed whether the statute of
limitations was tolled during the pendency of a suit later involuntarily dis-
missed without prejudice. The plaintiff sued the district, its chief of police,
and several other police officials. A prior suit on the same claim had been
involuntarily dismissed without prejudice. During the pendency of the
prior suit, the time limit under the applicable statute of limitations had
run. When the second action was brought, the trial court held that the
statute was not tolled during the first suit, and therefore plaintifi's second
action was time barred.'
2
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia af-
firmed. It noted that although the issue had not been resolved, York &
York Construction Co. v. Alexander13 had addressed a similar problem. In
York, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had determined that stat-
utes of limitations are not tolled during a suit later voluntarily dismissed
without prejudice. This followed the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion of Willard v. Wood. 4 The District of Columbia Circuit extended
York's reasoning to the instant case, stating that the important considera-
tion was not whether the dismissal was involuntary or voluntary, but
rather whether it was without prejudice. Thus, the court held that the stat-
ute of limitations in the District of Columbia is not tolled during the pen-
dency of a suit later involuntarily dismissed without prejudice.
In the District of Columbia, the statute of limitations applicable to fraud
actions begins to run when the injured party either discovers the fraud or
when he would have discovered it after a diligent effort.' 5 In Richards v.
Mileski,'6 the District of Columbia Circuit extended this "discovery" rule
to an unusual set of facts.
In Richards, the plaintiff sued six former federal officials alleging nu-
merous tort injuries.' 7 Each claim arose out of the defendants' alleged in-
11. 666 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
12. Dupree v. Jefferson, No. 79-1847 (D.D.C. May 29, 1979) (order dismissing action as
time barred).
13. 296 A.2d 710 (D.C. 1972).
14. 164 U.S. 502 (1896).
15. International Ladies' Garment Workers v. NLRB, 463 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Carmichael v. Egan, 433 F. Supp. 465 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 584 F.2d 558 (D.C. Cir. 1978); King v.
Kitchen Magic, Inc., 391 A.2d 1184 (D. C. 1978); Doolin v. Environmental Power, Ltd., 360
A.2d 493 (D.C. 1976).
16. 662 F.2d 65 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
17. Richards' complaint contained the following counts: fraudulent misrepresentation,
defamation of character, interference with economic advantage, intentional infliction of se-
[Vol. 31:841
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tentional falsification of investigative reports. These reports, made while
plaintiff was an employee of the United States Information Agency, la-
beled Richards a homosexual. Because of these charges, Richards resigned
in 1955. At that time, Richards knew neither the source of the charges nor
of the falsified reports. Twenty-three years later, through a Freedom of
Information Act request, Richards learned of the falsifications and
promptly brought suit.18
The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss without oral argu-
ment. Motions to reconsider and for leave to amend were similarly denied.
The District of Columbia Circuit reversed and remanded. The court first
noted that for federal claims in which no statute of limitations is specified,
the appropriate local statute is used.19 Second, it stated that even when the
local statute is borrowed, policies as to tolling of limitations on federal
claims remain a federal question.2° Tolling policies of common law tort
claims are governed by district precedents.2 In view of the foregoing, the
appeals court found Richards' action not barred by the statute of limita-
tions. It held that the statute of limitations began to run upon discovery.
The long period of time between the alleged tort complained of and its
discovery was irrelevant to computation of the limitations period.
III. VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL
Rule 41(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure22 governing a
plaintiff's right to voluntary dismissal, was adopted to guard against abu-
vere emotional distress, and violation of constitutional rights to privacy, due process and the
privileges and immunities of citizenship, Id at 67.
18. Id
19. The court cited Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 F.2d 220, 223 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Accord,
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975); Macklin v. Specter Freight
Sys., 478 F.2d 979, 994 (D. C. Cir. 1973); UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696
(1966).
20. See Fitzgerald v. Seamans, 553 F.2d 220, 228 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
21. The court cited Nyhus v. Travel Management Corp., 466 F.2d 440, 443 n. I1 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). Accord, Filson v. Fountain, 197 F.2d 383, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1952); Kaplan v. Man-
hattan Life Ins. Co., 109 F.2d 463, 465-66 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Wells v. Alropa Corp., 82 F.2d
887, 888 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1); D.C. SUPER CT.-CIv. R. 41(a)(l). These rules are identi-
cal and provide in part:
[A]n action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a
notice of dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or
of a motion for summary judgment, whichever first occurs. . . . Unless otherwise
stated in the notice of dismissal. . . the dismissal is without prejudice, except that
a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication upon the merits when filed by a
plaintiff who has once dismissed in any court of the United States or of any state an
action based on or including the same claim.
1982]
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sive use of voluntary nonsuits.2" Prior to its adoption, fedeal courts ap-
plied state law on voluntary dismissals in actions at law,24 pursuant to the
Conformity Act.25 State law varied widely but, in general, allowed liberal
use of voluntary nonsuit.26 In the District of Columbia, a plaintiff could
take nonsuit at any point up to the rendering of a verdict, subject only to
payment of the defendant's costs. 27 These liberal nonsuit provisions pro-
vided a powerful tool in vexatious litigation.2" Rule 41(a)(1) changed this
by granting a right to voluntary nonsuit only until defendant's answer was
served or until motion for summary judgment was made.
29
In Bernay v. Sales,° the District of Columbia Court of Appeals consid-
ered whether to impose additional restrictions, beyond those stated in the
rule on the nonsuit. In Bernay, plaintiff Sales had filed suit against Bernay
alleging loss of consortium, alienation of affection, and criminal conversa-
tion. The two latter causes of action have since been abolished by statute in
the District of Columbia.3 Although the plaintiff initially obtained a de-
fault judgment, the case was subsequently reopened and pretrial motions
were made. At this point, plaintiff filed a notice of dismissal of her com-
plaint. Although defendant opposed the notice, the trial court held that
23. 5 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE - 41.02[1] (2d
ed. 1981) (citing numerous United States Courts of Appeals opinions); 9 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2363 at 151-52 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
C. Wright & A. Miller].
24. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 23, at 151; but see Jones v. S.E.C., 298 U.S. 1,
19 (1936), where the Supreme Court indicated that voluntary nonsuits may be taken in both
legal and equitable actions: "[A] plaintiff possesses the unqualified right to dismiss his com-
plaint at law or his bill in equity unless some plain legal prejudice will result to the defend-
ant other than the mere prospect of a second litigation upon the subject matter."
25. Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, § 5, 17 Stat. 197, U.S. REV. STAT. tit. 13, ch. 18 § 914,
repealed by Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 39, 62 Stat. 992.
26. In some states, plaintiffs could dismiss up to the point where issue was joined. In
others, the right existed until trial began. In still others, dismissal could be had until the case
was submitted to the jury, and in some, at any time prior to verdict. C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, supra note 23, at 151. For a survey of previous state law on the subject, see Head,
The History and Development of Nonsuit, 27 W. VA. L.Q. 20 (1920) and Note, The Right of a
Flaintifl to Take a Voluntary Nonuit or to Dismiss His Action Without Preudice, 37 VA. L.
REV. 969 (1951).
27. American Electrotype Co. v. Kerschbaum, 105 F.2d 764 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (per
curiam).
28. Through the use of voluntary dismissal, defendant could be required to defend fully
a number of times against the same claim without the benefit of a conclusive judgment. See
generally id
29. Rule 41(a)(l), supra note 22. It is important also to note the two-dismissal limita-
tion. A second voluntary dismissal based upon or including the same claim is deemed an
adjudication on the merits and becomes law of the case.
30. Bernay, 424 A.2d 123 (D.C. 1980), vacated, 435 A.2d 398 (1981) (per curiam).
31. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-923 (1981).
[Vol. 31:841
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since plaintiff was technically in compliance with Rule 41(a)(1)(i), dismis-
sal must be granted. On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
affirmed the lower court's findings that plaintiff was in technical compli-
ance, but held that plaintiff was not entitled to dismissal as a matter of
right, under the doctrine enunciated by the Second Circuit in Harvey Alu-
minum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co.32 Rather, the court of appeals said
that dismissal should be granted, if at all, under Rule 41(a)(2), which pro-
vides for dismissal only by court order. In Harvey, the Second Circuit held
that dismissal is unavailable despite Rule 41(a)(1)(i) if three conditions ex-
ist: (1) the merits of the controversy have been fully presented to the court;
(2) the defendant has expended considerable amounts of time and effort in
establishing his or her defense; and (3) the plaintiffs chances of success on
the merits are extremely remote. 33 Noting that all three factors were pres-
ent in Bernay, the court remanded for a determination of whether dismis-
sal with court approval should be granted.34
Subsequently, however, the court of appeals granted plaintiffis petition
for rehearing and repudiated its previous adoption of Harvey.3 s In a per
curiam opinion, the court noted that the Harvey exception undermines the
compromise achieved in Rule 41(a)(1) and, as such, "presents an awkward
and potentially inequitable alternative to the rule.",36 It now found the ra-
tionale underlying the Harvey conditions to be the product of "vague tests,
susceptible of not only broad but inconsistent applications. 37
In rejecting the previously adopted Harvey exception, the court of ap-
peals has moved away from a distinctly minority view of Rule 41(a)(l).
Several circuits have criticized the Harvey doctrine and refused to adhere
to it.38 The Second Circuit itself has admitted its weaknesses. 39 Harvey is
32. 203 F.2d 105 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 964 (1953).
33. Harvey, 203 F.2d at 107-08.
34. Bernay, 424 A.2d at 125, 129.
35. Bernay v. Sales, 435 A.2d 398, 402-03 (D.C. 1981) (per curiam).
36. Id. at 403.
37. Id
38. D.C. Electronics, Inc. v. Nartron Corp., 511 F.2d 294, 297-98 (6th Cir. 1975) (merits
of controversy not before court thus Harvey rationale is without validity); Pilot Freight Car-
riers, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 506 F.2d 914 (5th Cir.), cer. denied, 422 U.S.
1048 (1975) (only minimum amount of time expended and no contention that there was only
a minimal chance of success on merits; alternative holding rejected broad reading of Har-
vey); Littman v. Bache & Co., 252 F.2d 479 (2d Cir. 1958) (merits not before court).
39. Thorp v. Scarne, 599 F.2d 1169 (2d Cir. 1979). The Second Circuit in this case said:
[Wjhile Harvey Aluminum may have furthered one purpose of Rule 41(a)(l)(i), that
of confining dismissals to an early stage of the proceedings, it did so at the expense
of a concurrent and perhaps equally important purpose, that of establishing a
bright line test marking the termination of a plaintiff's otherwise unfettered right
voluntarily and unilaterally to dismiss an action.
1982]
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increasingly being strictly limited to its facts. In the District of Columbia,
technical compliance with Rule 41(a)(1) continues to insure voluntary dis-
missal as a matter of right. As a result, the District retains an easily admin-
istered, bright line test for voluntary nonsuit. In avoiding the indefinite
determination and application of the Harvey criteria, moreover, the
Bernay holding advances the purpose of Rule 41(a)(1). The rule as now
interpreted advances the goals of certainty, uniformity, and consistency by
giving parties clear instructions as to when a voluntary nonsuit may be
taken.
IV. ADMISSIONS UNDER RULE 36
Under Rule 36 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, one party may
request another party to admit the truth of designated issues.4° If the other
party failes to respond within thirty days, those issues are deemed admit-
ted.4' Before its amendment in 1970, however, the rule was ambiguous
about the extent to which a party was bound by his admissions.42 The
changes made by the 1970 amendments were designed to clarify this ambi-
guity.43 They termed Rule 36 admissions as "conclusive."
Id. at 1175.
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 36; D.C. SUPER. CT.-CIv. R. 36.
41. Rule 36(a) states in part:
Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set forth. The
matter is admitted unless, within 30 days after service of the request, or within such
shorter or longer time as the court may allow, the party to whom the request is
directed serves upon the party requesting the admission a written answer or objec-
tion addressed to the matter ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 36(a); D.C. SUPER. CT.-CIv. R. 36(a).
42. Prior to the amendments, a number of courts viewed Rule 36 admissions as
equivalent to sworn testimony. Under those cases, admissions under the rule could be con-
troverted. See 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2264, at
741-42 nn.78-80 (1971).
43. Rule 36(b) now reads:
(b) Effect of Admission. Any matter admitted under this rule is conclusively estab-
lished unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admis-
sion. Subject to the provisions of Rule 16 governing amendment of a pre-trial
order, the court may permit withdrawal or amendment when the presentation of
the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the
admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice
him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits. Any admission made by a
party [pursuant to such request] under this rule is for the purpose of the pending
action only and [neither constitutes] is not an admission by him for any other pur-
pose nor may it be used against him in any other proceeding.
Material added in 1970 is italicized. Deleted material is bracketed. See also 4A J. MOORE &
J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 36.01[6] (2d ed. 1981). FED. R. Civ. P. 36; D.C.
SUPER. CT.-CIV. R. 36.
[Vol. 31:841
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In Rainbolt v. Johnson," the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia for the first time considered to what degree a trier of fact
was required to recognize admissions. Plaintiff brought suit against a
trustee and his wife alleging breach of trust and conspiracy. The United
States District Court referred the matter to an Auditor-Master. During dis-
covery, plaintiff served a number of requests for admissions on both de-
fendants, however, these were not answered within the thirty day limit nor
at any subsequent time prior to trial. The Auditor-Master made a report to
the district court containing findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a
recommended finding. In his report, the Auditor-Master gave binding ef-
fect to some of the issues deemed admitted by defendants' failure to re-
spond, but completely ignored others. The district court adopted the report
and rendered judgment for plaintiff.
Because the Auditor-Master had ignored admissions that entitled plain-
tiff to damages five times greater than those actually granted, Rainbolt ap-
pealed the judgment. He argued that the Auditor-Master should have
given binding effect to all admissions. The court of appeals agreed and
held that all admissions were conclusively binding. It remanded the case to
the district court with instructions to enter judgment for the higher
amount.45
The Rainbolt decision is in keeping with the purpose of the 1970 amend-
ments.46 If admissions are not deemed conclusive, Rule 36 is of little help
in framing and narrowing the issues before trial. Conversely, parties would
have to prepare evidence and defenses despite the securing of admissions.
As a result, the time required to prepare for and conduct a trial would be
considerably lengthened.
V. NOTICE: SUITS AGAINST THE SOVEREIGN
The District of Columbia has in some circumstances statutorily waived
the immunity granted it by the common law doctrine of sovereign immu-
44. 669 F.2d.767 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
45. Id at 769.
46. The advisory committee note on the 1970 amendments state:
The new provisions give an admission a conclusively binding effect, for purposes
only of the pending action, unless the admission is withdrawn or amended. In form
and substance a Rule 36 admission is comparable to an admission in pleadings or a
stipulation drafted by counsel for use at trial, rather than to an evidentiary admis-
sion of a party ..... Unless the party securing an admission can depend on its
binding effect, he cannot safely avoid the expense of preparing to prove the very
matters on which he has secured the admission, and the purpose of the rule is
defeated.
FED. R. Civ. P. 36 advisory committee note (citations omitted).
1982]
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nity.47 As a prerequisite to the grant of a particular cause of action, section
12-309 of the D.C. Code requires notice be given the District within six
months after the cause of action arises.48 In Gwinn v. District of Colum-
bia,4" the District of Columbia Court of Appeals for the first time ad-
dressed whether the required period for notice is tolled during plaintiffs
minority. °
In Gwinn, plaintiff-appellant sued supervisory school personnel for inju-
ries sustained during an altercation on school grounds in June 1968. 5'
Gwinn was eleven years old at the time of the incident. No written notice
of the claim was given to the District of Columbia until suit was filed in
January 1978, over nine years after the injury had occurred. The trial court
granted defendant-appellee's motion to dismiss with prejudice on the
ground that the notice requirements of section 12-309 had not been met.
On appeal to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, Gwinn argued
that section 12-302 of the D.C. Code should be incorporated implicitly into
the notice provision. Section 12-302 of the D.C. Code allows for the tolling
of the statute of limitations during a prospective litigant's minority. 2 The
court, however, rejected this argument. Noting that section 12-309 is in
derogation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the court stated that it
should be strictly construed. 3 To permit the notice period to be tolled dur-
ing minority would allow a delay in excess of seventeen years before the
District of Columbia need be notified. Such a holding would ignore both
47. D.C. CODE Ai. § 1-1202 (1981).
48. D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-309 (1981) provides in relevant part:
An action may not be maintained against the District of Columbia for unliqui-
dated damages to person or property unless, within six months after the injury or
damage was sustained, the claimant, his agent, or attorney has given notice in writ-
ing to the Commissioner [Mayor] of the District of Columbia of the approximate
time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage.
49. 434 A.2d 1376 (D.C. 1981).
50. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has previously addressed the procedure
and sufficiency of notice under § 12-309. See DeKine v. District of Columbia, 422 A.2d 981
(D.C. 1980); Breen v. District of Columbia, 400 A.2d 1058 (D.C. 1979); Washington v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 429 A.2d 1362, 1365 (D.C. 1981).
51. The plaintiff's complaint alleged District school employees were negligent in their
failure to prevent the altercation, in their failure to stop it once it had commenced, and in
their failure to obtain medical attention for plaintiff. Plaintiffs injuries included the loss of
sight in one eye.
52. D.C. CODE ANN. § 12-302 (1981) provides in pertinent part: "(a) . . . [W~hen a
person entitled to maintain an action is, at the time the right of action accrues: (1) under 18
years of age . . . he or his proper representative may bring action within the time limited
after the disability is removed."
53. 434 A.2d at 1378. See Pitts v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 803 (D.C. 1978);
Braxton v. National Capital Housing Auth., 396 A.2d 215 (D.C. 1978). See also Stone v.
District of Columbia, 237 F.2d 28, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (Prettyman, J., dissenting).
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Practice and Pleadings
statutory language and legislative purpose.54 Therefore, the court held that
the required time period for notice of claim under section 12-309 is not
tolled during the minority of the prospective plaintiff."
VI. ATTACHMENT BEFORE JUDGMENT
The Supreme Court has held that state statutes granting the provisional
remedy of attachment before judgment must meet the requirements of the
due process clause.56 To pass this test, the statutes must provide certain
protections for the defendant-debtor.57 The District of Columbia statute
providing for attachment before judgment58 has been held to conform to
these requirements.59 One of the protections it provides is to require the
54. Gwinn, 434 A.2d at 1378. See also Shehyn v. District of Columbia, 392 A.2d 1008,
1013 (D.C. 1978); Miller v. Spencer, 330 A.2d 250, 251 (D.C. 1974); Hurd v. District of
Columbia, 106 A.2d 702, 704 (D.C. 1954).
55. Gwinn, 434 A.2d at 1378-79.
56. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I states: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
57. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (defendant's protections include the right
to have plaintiff post a protective bond, the right to recover possession of the goods if the
defendant posts a bond, and the right to a hearing prior to any seizure of his property).
58. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-501 (1981) provides in pertinent part:
(a) This section applies to any civil action in the United States District Court of
the District of Columbia or the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, for the
recovery of:
(1) specific personal property;
(2) a debt; or
(3) damages for the breach of a contract, express or implied.
(e) Before a writ of attachment and garnishment is issued, the plaintiff shall first
file in the clerk's office a bond, executed by himself or his agent, with security to be
approved by the clerk, in twice the amount of his claim, conditioned to make good
to the defendant all costs and damages which he may sustain by reason of the
wrongful suing out of the attachment; except that in any case in which the plaintiff
states in his affidavit that the value of specified property to be levied upon is less
than the amount of his claim, the court may set the amount of such bond in an
amount twice the value of the property being attached, and, notwithstanding the
provisions of subsection (f) of this section, only the property so specified shall be
levied upon. ...
(f) If the plaintiff files an affidavit and bond as provided by this section, the clerk
shall issue a writ of attachment and garnishment, to be levied upon as much of the
lands, tenements, goods, chattels, and credits of the defendant as may be necessary
to satisfy the claim of the plaintiff.
59. Tucker v. Burton, 319 F. Supp. 567, 572 (D.D.C. 1970). For a discussion of the
validity of prejudgment seizures, see Annot., 18 A.L.R. FED. 223 (1974); Note, Quasiin Rem
Jurisdiction and Due Process Requirements, 82 YALE L.J. 1023 (1973).
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posting of a bond by the plaintiff. This procedure is designed to insure
defendant against damages arising from wrongful attachment. The
amount of the bond must be for twice the amount of the claim or, if the
value of the property attached is less than the amount of the claim, twice
the value of the property seized.6" In Metro Rentals, Inc. v. Wagner,6' the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed whether the posting of a
bond for less than the statutorily required amount renders the subsequent
writ of attachment void.
Metro Rentals sought to set aside the writ of attachment of a competing
judgment creditor, Wagner. Wagner had previously obtained a judgment
against the common judgment debtor in Virginia and had filed suit on the
judgment in the District of Columbia. Pending the outcome of the District
of Columbia suit, Wagner moved under section 16-501 for prejudgment
attachment of funds in control of a local law firm. The trial court granted
the motion and ordered the appellee Wagner to post bond equal to the
amount of his claim. Appellant Metro Rentals, through a separate action,
obtained a writ of attachment on the same funds at a later date. Metro
Rentals sought and was granted leave to intervene in Wagner's case
against the common defendant for the purpose of establishing the priority
of the liens. Metro Rentals moved to have Wagner's attachment declared
void on the ground that Wagner had failed to post bond in the amount
required by section 16-501(e). The trial court denied the motion.
On appeal, appellant again argued that the filing of a proper bond was a
prerequisite to the validity of the issued writ. The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the trial court's ruling. The pur-
pose of the bond requirement, it said, was to protect the defendant-debtor.
The filing of an affidavit required under section 16-501(b), (c), and (f),
provided the jurisdictional basis for the writ to issue. When bond posted
was for less than the required amount, the proper course was to allow de-
fendant to proceed under section 16-505,62 rather than to set aside the writ.
In view of the available statutory remedy and the perceived limited pur-
60. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-501(e) (1981).
61. 435 A.2d 1072 (D.C. 1981).
62. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-505 (1981) provides:
The defendant or any other person interested in the proceedings who is not satis-
fied with the sufficiency of the surety or with the amount of the penalty named in
the bond filed pursuant to section 16-501, may apply to the court for an order
requiring the plaintiff to give an additional bond in such sum and with such secur-
ity as may be approved by the court. If the plaintiff fails to comply with any such
order the court may order the attachment to be quashed and any property attached
or its proceeds to be returned to the defendant or otherwise disposed of, as to the
court may seem proper.
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pose of section 16-501(e), the court held that a statutorily insufficient bond
did not affect the validity of the issuing writ.
The court cited;Cooper v. Reynolds,63 and WB. Moses & Sons v. Hayes
64
to support this conclusion. Cooper, however, involved the interpretation of
a Tennessee attachment statute. The reliance on Cooper as controlling the
interpretation of the District of Columbia statute in both Moses and Metro
Rentals appears misplaced. Further, Moses and Cooper involved defend-
ant-debtor challenges to the validity of writs issued upon them. As such
they are not factually on point. The holding in Metro Rentals ignores the
language of section 16-501(f) which directs the clerk to issue a writ of at-
tachment "[i]f the plaintiff files an affidavit and bond as provided by this
section .... ,65 The section clearly requires posting of a bond for twice
the amout of the claim. Also ignored are cases which stress that attach-
ment before judgment is a drastic remedy and requires strict compliance
with statutory procedures.66
Despite its questionable support, Metro Rentals establishes that failure
to meet the bond requirements of section 16-501(e) does not affect the va-
lidity of the writ of attachment subsequently issued. Failure to meet the
affidavit requirements of section 16-501(b), (c), and (d) renders the writ
void.67 Failure to meet the notice requirements of section 16-502 renders
the lien created by the attachment unperfected.68
Robert Singletary
63. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308 (1870).
64. 36 App. D.C. 194 (D.C. Cir. 1911).
65. See D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-501() (1981), supra note 58 (emphasis added).
66. Jack Development, Inc. v. Howard Eales, Inc., 388 A.2d 466, 468-69 (D.C. 1978)
(noncompliance with notice requirements under attachment statute renders lien unperfected
against other; priority lost as to those persons); Petroni v. Bass, 186 F. Supp. 759, 760
(D.D.C. 1960) (conclusory statements contained in affidavit insufficient to state facts show-
ing grounds of claim; affidavit held insufficient and writ quashed); Rieffer v. Home Indem-
nity Co., 61 A.2d 26, 27 (D.C.), mod#Fedon other grounds, 62 A.2d 371 (D.C. 1948) (facts
alleged in affidavit held insufficient to allow conclusion that debtor was evading service of
process; writ quashed).
67. Petroni, 186 F. Supp. at 760; Rieffer, 61 A.2d at 27.
68. Jack Development, Inc., 388 A.2d at 468.
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